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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

PEGGY B. JOHNSON,

:

Case No- 900088

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant• ;

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction for three counts of
attempted first degree murder, all first degree felonies, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-202 and 76-4-101 (1990), and
distribution of a controlled substance, marijuana, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii)
(1990).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1989) because the appeal is
from a district court in a criminal case involving a first degree
felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the

jury's verdict.

The standard of review in jury verdicts is

whether the evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime.
1161, 1168 (Utah 1980).

State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d

2.

Whether defendant has waived the right to challenge

the admission of her statements by failing to raise an objection
to their admission at trial. Generally, appellate courts will
not address issues raised for the first time on appeal.

State v.

Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987).
3.

Whether the trial court correctly determined that

the corpus delicti rule did not apply to the statements of
defendant.

This is a question of law subject to correction of

error standard of review.

City of Monticello v. Christensen, 129

Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 6 (Utah March 2, 1990).
4.

Whether defendant's statements were sufficiently

corroborated to allow their admission into evidence under the
corpus delicti rule.

Since there was no objection at trial to

admission of the statements and the trial court's finding after
trial did not address the sufficiency to establish corpus
delicti, this Court may only review the issue under a plain error
standard.

However, defendant has not argued plain error.

State

v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 581 (Utah 1983), cert, denied Norton v.
Utah, 466 U.S. 942 (1984).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies are included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged on February 1, 1988, with three
counts of attempted first degree murder, all felonies of the
first degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-202 and 764-101 (1990), and one count of distribution of a controlled

substance, marijuana, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1990) (Record [hereinafter R.] at 3-5).
Defendant's trial counsel, Quinn D. Hunsaker, filed
several pretrial motions, including a motion for transcript of
the preliminary hearing, for a bill of particulars, for release
of evidence, for court funds for discovery and preparation for
trial, for discovery, and for a court appointed expert witness
(R. at 102-106, 110-19 and 157).

Counsel also filed a notice of

entrapment defense (R. at 127). The court granted the motions
for a transcript of the preliminary hearing, for a bill of
particulars, to release evidence, for discovery, and took under
advisement the motions for court funds and for a court appointed
expert (R. at 103, 106, 111, 117, 113, 119, and 129).
The trial court heard the entrapment motion on
September 8, 1988, and denied it (R. at 160). Trial settings of
July 11, 1988, and August 29, 1988, were vacated and defendant
was tried by jury on September 12 through 16, 1988, in the First
Judicial District Court, in and for Box Elder County, the
Honorable Gordon J. Low, district judge, presiding (R. at 96-99
and 125).

Defendant was found guilty as charged (R. at 200-202

and transcripts of trial).
On October 13, 1988, Ronald J. Yengich entered his
appearance of counsel, and, on October 26, 1988, Mr. Yengich
filed a motion to continue sentencing (R. at 244-45).

A motion

to set bail pending sentencing was filed on October 24, 1988 (R.
at 257). A hearing on both motions was held on October 26, 1988,
and the sentencing was continued until November 7, 1988; the

motion to set bail was denied (R. at 261). On November 7, 1988,
defendant was sentenced to five years to life in the Utah State
Prison on each of counts one, two and three, and zero to five
years in the Utah State Prison on count four. All terms were to
run concurrently and defendant was ordered to pay restitution in
the amount of $14,841.02 (R. at 262) An order memorializing that
sentence was signed by Judge Low on November 9, 1988 (R. at 26465).
On November 18, 1988, defendant filed a motion for new
trial, but did not state a basis for the motion or attach
affidavits or evidence (R. at 266-67).

Defendant then filed a

notice of appeal and a motion for certificate of probable cause
in the district court on November 22, 1988 (R. at 268 and 272).
The prosecution filed an objection to the motion for new trial,
stating that because the motion did not give the grounds for a
new trial, the prosecution was unable to prepare a response (R.
at 275). The prosecution also asked for a hearing on the motion
for certificate of probable cause (R. at 277). The trial court
ordered that the motion for new trial would not be heard until
defendant filed the affidavits and memoranda required by the
rules.

The court also ordered defendant to submit affidavits and

memoranda in support of the motion for certificate of probable
cause (R. at 285-86).
At a hearing on May 2, 1989, defense counsel was given
three weeks to file a brief in support of the motion for new
trial, and the prosecutor allowed two weeks to respond (R. at
295).

In a memorandum in support of the motion for new trial or,
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in the alternative, motion for dismissal, filed on June 22, 1989,
defendant raised the claim that the evidence was insufficient to
support the verdicts at trial (R. at 298-304).

Then, for the

first time, defendant claimed that her statements should not have
been admitted because the State had failed to establish the
corpus delicti before introducing the statements (R. at 305-10).
The motion for new trial was finally argued on August 29, 1989,
and was taken under advisement (R. at 326). In a memorandum
decision issued September 7, 1989, the trial court denied the
motion and an order to that effect was signed on September 19,
1989 (R. at 327-31).

Defendant filed a second notice of appeal

from the original judgment and sentence and from the denial of
the motion for new trial on September 22, 1989 (R. at 332).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant is married to Danny Johnson, the victim in
this case (Transcript [hereinafter Tr.] at 363). Defendant is a
bail bondswoman in Box Elder County and also owns a bar called
"The Shack" in Willard, Utah (Tr. at 663, 501, 670 and 702).
Cindy Orozco first met defendant in approximately 1982 when
defendant bailed Cindy out of jail (Tr. at 398 and 663).
Defendant provided that service for Cindy at least one more time
and was aware that Cindy had eventually gone to prison (Tr. at
663-64).

Cindy had also asked defendant to bail Cindy's husband,

Richard (nicknamed Penny), but defendant was unable to do so
because defendant was not authorized to post: a bond in the Ogden
City Jail (Tr. at 664 and 400).

In December 1987, defendant contacted Cindy through
another person because Cindy did not have a telephone in her home
(Tr. at 398-99).

Cindy returned the call and defendant began

talking to Cindy about a guitar and car stereo which Cindy and
Penny had given defendant as collateral for a bail bond (Tr. at
399).

Cindy had assumed that the items were gone because the

Orozcos had not paid defendant, but defendant told Cindy that she
wanted to talk about how the Orozcos could get the property back
(Tr. at 399).
Within a week, defendant met with the Orozcos (Tr. at
400).

During the conversation, defendant asked Cindy if Cindy

knew of a drug with which a person could overdose (Tr. at 400).
At that time, the Orozcos were involved in drug use (Tr. at 401).
Defendant told the Orozcos that she wanted to "get rid of her
husband" because they were having problems (Tr. at 401 and 670).
Cindy did not want to get involved so she walked away and the
subject changed to a discussion about defendant helping Penny set
up a recording session for his singing (Tr. at 401-402).
Defendant met again with Cindy in the first part of
January 1988 and told her that defendant's husband, Danny, had a
girlfriend, that Danny was beating defendant, and that defendant
could not divorce Danny because she thought Danny "would get half
of everything that [defendant's] dad had left her" (Tr. at 403404).

At that meeting, Cindy told defendant that she had checked

with "a few people" and it would cost $300.00 to buy enough
heroin to overdose Danny.

The Orozcos then got in defendant's

car and traveled with her to Ogden (Tr. at 404).

In Ogden, defendant and Penny got out of the car at a
bar and Cindy took the car to a drug dealer's house.

Cindy

remembers that defendant either handed her the $300.00 or left it
next to the driver's seat in the car (Tr. at 404-405).

The

dealer told Cindy where she could get the heroin and sold a half
gram of cocaine to Cindy.

Cindy returned to the bar and lied to

defendant, telling her that Cindy had purchased a sample of
heroin to "see how good it was" (Tr. at 405). Cindy tried to
return the balance of the money to defendant, but defendant told
Cindy to keep it; defendant said that she trusted Cindy (Tr. at
405-406).

Cindy told defendant that she would go to Salt Lake

City the next day and purchase the heroin.

Defendant then took

Cindy and Penny back to their home (Tr. at 406).
The next day, defendant returned to ask Cindy if she
had purchased the heroin.

Cindy lied to her and said a friend

was going to bring it and, probably the next day.

Cindy did not

purchase the heroin at that time; instead, she and Penny spent
the $300.00 on cocaine for themselves (Tr. at 407 and 620-21).
For a week, defendant continually asked whether the heroin was
available yet; meanwhile, Cindy went out stealing every day in an
effort to get the money to return to defendant.

Eventually,

Cindy told defendant that the money had been spent and asked
defendant if she was trying to set Cindy up (Tr. at 408).
Defendant assured Cindy that defendant was not trying to send
Cindy back to prison (Tr. at 409). Defendant also brought one of
her daughter's to Cindy's house to tell about the beatings by
Danny; this convinced Cindy to help defendant (Tr. at 410 and
622).

The Orozcos went to a source in Ogden who told them
that it would cost $450.00 for the amount of heroin they wanted
(Tr. at 411). On January 21, 1988, the Orozcos went to the Shack
and met with defendant (Tr. at 412).

Pursuant to defendant's

plan, Cindy played a dice game that was set up at the bar and
defendant handed her the $450.00 as if they were gambling
winnings (Tr. at 413-15, 578-80 and 616). The Orozcos left the
bar and went to Salt Lake where they purchased the heroin and
some cocaine (Tr. at 416-17).

They went back to Ogden, called

defendant at the Shack and told her that they had the heroin (Tr.
at 417-18).

Defendant told Cindy that she would go to Cindy's

house to pick it up (Tr. at 418).
Before defendant arrived, Cindy and Penny mixed some of
the heroin with cocaine and used it. When defendant arrived,
Cindy told Penny to give the heroin to defendant, that Cindy did
not want to deal with it (Tr. at 418-19 and 618-19).

Cindy

watched Penny hand the heroin to defendant, then rebuffed
defendant when defendant thanked her (Tr. at 419).
About three days later, on January 24, Penny wanted to
purchase more cocaine and sent Cindy to defendant's house to ask
to borrow money (Tr. at 420). At that time, defendant told Cindy
that the heroin had not worked (Tr. at 420-21).
On January 27, 1988, Cindy was aware that the police
were looking for her about some stolen property (Tr. at 423 and
99).

Cindy met with officer Marci Vaughn of the Ogden Police

Department on that day to offer to help apprehend drug dealers in
return for leniency on a theft charge (Tr. at 423, 91 and 99).
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Cindy also met with her parole officer and told him about
defendant's attempt to kill Danny.

The parole officer told

Officer Vaughn about the attempted homicide and Officer Vaughn
confronted Cindy with the information (Tr. at 424 and 102-103).
Cindy decided to cooperate with the police in investigating the
allegations against defendant (Tr. at 424-25).
The next day, Cindy met with Officer Vaughn and Officer
Steve Vojtecky of the Utah Division of Investigations (Tr. at
114-15).

At Officer Vojtecky's direction, Cindy telephoned

defendant at the Shack in an attempt to verify the information
which Cindy had given the officers (Tr. at 116-17).

That

conversation was recorded and introduced at trial as Exhibit 1
(the tape) and Exhibit 7 (a transcript of the tape) (Tr. at 11718).

In that conversation, defendant told Cindy that she had a

"new idea" but would not speak about it because Danny was there
(St. Exh. #7 at page 2).

Cindy made a second telephone call to

defendant at her home which was also recorded (Tr. at 118). In
this call, defendant said that she did not want to talk about the
"new idea" over the telephone (St. Exh. #7 at page 8).
A planned meeting between defendant and Cindy for 2:00
p.m. on January 29 fell through because defendant had car trouble
(St. Exh. #7 at pages 16-17).

As agreed between defendant and

Cindy, Cindy went to defendant's home at approximately 6:00 p.m.
on January 29 (St. Exh. #7 at page 17 and St. Exh. 8-1 at page
1).

Cindy wore a body mike and Officer Vojtecky recorded the

conversation from outside the Johnson home (Tr. at 130). In the
home, defendant asked Cindy if she knew where to get some "crank"
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which is a street name for methamphetamine (St. Exh. #8-1 at page
3, and Tr. at 174-75).

Defendant told Cindy that defendant had

seen a program on TV in which they had said that too much crank
would kill a person (St. Exh. #8-1 at page 4).

Defendant then

told Cindy that she had used the heroin, Decon (a rodent poison),
and oxalic acid to try to kill Danny (St. Exh. #8-1 at page 4).
Defendant told Cindy that she had used a whole bottle of oxalic
acid by putting it in Danny's medicine capsules (St. Exh. #8-1 at
pages 4-5). She showed Cindy the bottle with the crystalline
substance in it (Tr. at 428). Defendant then asked how much
liquid heroin it would take to kill Danny and discussed how to
administer the overdose (St. Exh. #8-1 at page 5).

Cindy left,

saying that she would see what she could do about getting crank
(St. Exh. #8-1 at page 7).
After leaving the home, Cindy met with Officer Vojtecky
who asked her to go back into the home and ask for money for the
crank and to try to get defendant to tell Cindy again how she was
going to administer the drug (St. Exh. #8-1 at page 8).

Cindy

returned to the home and asked defendant how she was going to
give Danny the drug; defendant replied that she was going to put
it in his capsules (St. Exh. #8-1 at page 10. Defendant then
said:
I cannot tell how his stomach can hold up to
it. I can't. I . . . I mean I really
believe only the good die young.
(St. Exh. #8-1 at page 10).

Defendant also suggested some drug

dealers that Cindy could contact to try to get the
methamphetamine (St. Exh. #8-1 at page 10).

About four hours later, Cindy telephoned defendant at
the Shack and told her that Cindy would be able to get the crank.
Cindy asked Danny's weight and size in order to tell how much
crank was needed.

Defendant asked how much the drug was per gram

and Cindy asked if defendant wanted her to ask how much it would
cost for an amount sufficient to kill someone.

Defendant told

her not to tell her friend that, because defendant did not want
Cindy's friend to know what the drug was for (St. Exh. #9-1 at
page 2). Defendant told Cindy Danny's weight and height and
Cindy told defendant that it would take about a quarter-ounce of
crank and would cost $500.00.

Defendant appeared unhappy that it

would cost so much and asked for time to decide.

Cindy told

defendant that the overdose would cause kidney failure and that
the dealer was running low on the drug.

Defendant asked Cindy to

call back in an hour (St. Exh. #9-1 at page 3). Cindy called
back and defendant told her that defendant wanted the crank, but
that she would not have the cash until the next morning.

They

arranged for defendant to go to Cindy's house to get the drug the
next day (St. Exh. #9-1 at page 4).
On January 30, 1988, defendant did not arrive at
Cindy's house at the arranged time, so Cindy telephoned defendant
(St. Exh. #10 and Tr. at 138 and 140-41).

Defendant said that

she had forgotten to do her quarterly taxes which were due by
2:00 p.m.

Cindy asked if defendant still wanted the crank and

defendant replied that she did.

Defendant said that she would be

at Cindy's house in an hour and a half and would bring the money
(St. Exh. #10 at page 2). Defendant said that she was getting
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the money as a check from defendant's mother and that she would
have to cash it (St. Exh. #10 at page 3).
At approximately 2:15 p.m. on January 30, Officer
Vaughn searched Cindy at Cindy's house prior to defendant
arriving there (St. Exh. #10 at page 3).

Officer Vaughn then hid

in a closet and took notes of the meeting between Cindy and
defendant (Tr. at 109-110 and 237).

Officer Vojtecky was acting

as Cindy's boyfriend at that point and was lying on her couch as
if asleep (Tr. at 109 and 237-38).

Officer Mike Johnson of the

Box Elder County Sheriff's Office was outside in a surveillance
van recording the meeting from a mike worn by Cindy (Tr. at 14243 and 238; a copy of the transcript of the tape is attached to
this brief as Addendum A).

Defendant arrived at approximately

3:30 p.m. (Tr. at 238)
When defendant arrived at Cindy's house they began
discussing whether the drug could be placed in Danny's coffee and
whether it was bitter (St. Exh. #11 at pages 1-2). Cindy asked
how defendant was going to give the drug to Danny and defendant
said she did not know, that that is why she wondered what it
looked like.

She and Cindy discussed what volume the powder

would be (St. Exh. #11 at page 2).

Officer Vojtecky entered the

conversation at that point and Cindy vouched for him to defendant
(St. Exh. #11 at pages 3-4). Defendant asked Officer Vojtecky
whether crank was bitter and they discussed whether it could be
put in coffee.

They discussed how big Danny was; then defendant

asked Cindy if she had told Vojtecky what defendant had already
tried.

Defendant then told Vojtecky that she had put nearly a
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whole bottle of the crystalline oxalic acid in Danny's capsules
over the previous month and it "ha[dn't] worked" (St. Exh. #11 at
page 4).

Defendant told Vojtecky that Danny was still taking the

oxalic acid.

Danny was taking "four different kinds of pills

every day" and that the oxalic acid was in some of the pills (St.
Exh. #11 at page 5).
Defendant then told Vojtecky that she had given Danny a
whole box of Decon (a rodent poison) in his capsules but that
that "[d]idn't do a thing" (St. Exh. #11 at page 5).

She told

him about putting the heroin in a capsule on January 21; Danny
had taken it, and five hours later he vomited.

Defendant went

into great detail about how the heroin was placed in the capsule
and how she had given the doctored capsule to Danny directly (St.
Exh. #11 at pages 6-7). Defendant and Vojtecky discussed what
defendant's plan was when Danny was dead; defendant explained her
reasons for wanting to kill Danny (St. Exh. #11 at pages 7-8).
In response to questions from Vojtecky, defendant said
that she was going to put the crank in Danny's coffee one night
when he came home (St. Exh. #11 at page 8).

Defendant told

Vojtecky that she had tried for two years to divorce Danny but
was afraid that he would get half of the property left to her by
her father.

Vojtecky told her that the "stuff" (methamphetamine)

would kill Danny, and asked if she wanted to kill him.
responded, "This sounds horrible, but yes."

Defendant

They then talked

about where defendant got the money for the drug (St. Exh. #11 at
page 9).

-13-

Defendant told Vojtecky and Cindy that Danny was always
taking other people's prescription drugs and that no one would
ever think that defendant had killed her husband.

Defendant

talked about the fact that it was costing her $1300.00 to try to
kill Danny.

The money was spent for the purchase of the heroin

and the crank and, to that point, "nothing has worked" (St. Exh.
#11 at page 10).

The three discussed how to make contact to hand

over the methamphetamine after Vojtecky and Cindy supposedly
purchased it (St. Exh. #11 at page 11 and St. Exh. 21 at page
12).

In reality, Cindy and Officer Vaughn had earlier mixed

brown sugar and flour to make a fake "crank" to give to defendant
(Tr. at 95).
Before defendant left Cindy's home, Vojtecky asked
defendant whether she was going to give Danny the drug that
night; defendant answered that she would probably wait until the
next night or Monday night.

Vojtecky again asked if defendant

was going to put the drug in Danny's coffee.

Defendant asked

Vojtecky, "Do you want to take me out next week? (laughter)" (St.
Exh. #21 at page 12).

Throughout the whole encounter, defendant

was very cordial to Vojtecky (Tr. at 239). She gave him five
$100.00 bills to purchase the supposed methamphetamine (Tr. at
240).
Defendant again justified her actions by telling
Vojtecky that Danny had beaten her and the children.

When

Vojtecky asked why she did not go to the police, she responded
that she did not get along with the sheriff's office because she
was a bail bondsman and had been involved when an officer had

been accused of raping a woman prisoner (St. Exh. #21 at page 1314).

After defendant left, Officer Vojtecky sought and received

a search warrant to search defendant's person, home and car (R.
at 74-81).
Vojtecky and Cindy telephoned defendant to arrange the
final meeting during which they would give defendant the "crank"
(Tr. at 240). This meeting occurred at an old Highway Patrol
weigh station near Willard, Utah (Tr. at 240 and 425).

At 8:43

the evening of January 30, defendant met with Vojtecky and Cindy
and received the "crank" (St. Exh. #12 and Tr. at 425-26 and 24045).

The recording of that meeting was "quite poor" because the

microphone picked up traffic noise from the nearby road (Tr. at
241).

When Vojtecky handed defendant the counterfeit

methamphetamine, defendant, who was seated in the driver's seat
of her car, appeared to place it under the dashboard or into a
side panel of the car (Tr. at 426 and 247). Defendant then
reached quickly toward her back and brought her hand forward with
a small baggie of marijuana in it (Tr. at 247-28 and 426).
Defendant handed the baggie to Cindy and said that it was
something extra for them.

Cindy took the baggie which Vojtecky

eventually retrieved from her after defendant left (Tr. at 248).
Vojtecky asked the name of whom defendant intended to kill, but
defendant declined to tell him (Tr. at 427 and St. Exh. 12 at
page 1).
After defendant left Cindy and Vojtecky, other officers
stopped her car and searched it for the "crank".

They were

unable to find the substance even though officers went the next

day and searched for it by the roadway (Tr, at 269-70 and 29599).
Around the time that the meeting with and arrest of
defendant were occurring, officers went to the Shack and told
Danny of his wife's attempts to kill him (Tr. at 213).

The

officers asked forf and received, a pill bottle from Danny which
contained capsules (Tr. at 209-210, 212 and 363). These capsules
and bottle were given to an evidence officer who then turned them
over to the Weber State College Crime Lab for testing (Tr. at
216, 231 and 161).

The capsules were marked as ampicillin but

did not appear to contain that substance (Tr. at 165). Testing
showed that the capsules contained the same substance as a bottle
marked oxalic acid which was seized from defendant's home (Tr. at
166-69).
The evidence officer, Lynn Yeates of the Box Elder
County Sheriff's Office, was involved in executing the search
warrant for defendant's home (Tr. at 219-20).

It was he who

found the oxalic acid bottle under the kitchen sink in
defendant's home (Tr. at 219-20 and 233).

He transported this

item to the Weber State Crime Lab, along with the capsules
retrieved from Danny Johnson and the baggie of marijuana given to
Cindy by defendant (Tr. at 220-21 and 231-35).
The victim took the stand in the State's case-in-chief
and testified that he had been taking the supposed ampicillin
capsules off and on for a month (Tr. at 363). He had not noticed
any problem with the pills that he took from the original
prescription; however, he had experienced stomach cramps,
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weakness and a burning sensation in his esophagus when his
prescription had been refilled.

He had assumed that the refill

was causing the problem (Tr. at 364-65).

Defendant had refilled

the prescription about three weeks before her arrest and had told
Danny that it was a generic brand of ampicillin (Tr. at 372).
Danny said that every time he took one of the pills, his stomach
would knot up for about three hours (Tr. at 373).
Danny also testified that defendant had given him a
capsule before he went to bed on the night of January 21-22, 1988
(Tr. at 366). He slept until about 6:00 a.m., then woke with
stomach discomfort (Tr. at 366 and 382-83).

He was dizzy,

suffered cold sweats, vomited and was unable to go to a scheduled
pool tournament (Tr. at 366-67 and 383).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
support defendant's convictions for attempted murder by three
different means.

First, defendant purchased heroin with the

stated intent to use it to kill her husband.
in a capsule and gave it to her husband.

She put the heroin

He became violently ill

and vomited; the attempted heroin overdose did not have its
desired effect.

Second, defendant filled the victim's ampicillin

capsules with oxalic acid, a poison if too much is introduced
into the body.
a month.

She administered these capsules over a course of

The capsules caused the victim to have stomach cramps,

weakness, and a burning sensation in his esophagus.

Finally,

defendant purchased what she thought was methamphetamine, with
the stated purpose of administering an overdose to her husband.
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Defendant has waived her right to challenge on appeal
the admission of her statements by failing to object to their
admission at the time of trial.
The trial court's determination that the corpus delicti
rule did not apply to defendant's out-of-court statements was not
error.

Case law supports a finding that the corpus delicti rule

does not apply to pre-crime statements.

There is also support

for a theory that statements such as those in the present case
should be treated differently than confessions made to
authorities when the declarant is aware that the authorities
suspect him or her of criminal activity.
The State urges this Court to adopt a reliability of
confession approach for corroboration in attempt crimes because
such crimes do not have the completed injury or wrong required
for the traditional corpus delicti rule.

Such a standard has

been adopted by the majority of federal jurisdictions and several
states.

This different approach accomplishes the same purposes

as the traditional rule without causing some of the problems
found when the traditional rule is applied.

Under this

trustworthiness approach, defendant's statements are admissible
because their trustworthiness was independently corroborated.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICTS
CONVICTING DEFENDANT.
Defendant first claims that the evidence presented at
trial does not support the jury's verdicts convicting her of
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three counts of attempted murder.

The appellate courts of this

state have repeatedly articulated the standard of review on
appeal when the argument concerns sufficiency of the evidence.
The appellate courts accord great deference to the jury verdict.
It is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence
and determine the credibility of the witnesses.

"[T]he Court

should only interfere when . . . reasonable men could not
possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt."
State v. Lammf 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980).

Furthermore,

defendant has the burden of establishing "that the evidence was
so inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime."

State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980).

also State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989).

See

The courts

have succinctly stated that, unless there is a clear showing of a
lack of evidence, the jury verdict will be upheld.

See Lamm, 606

P.2d at 231.
Inherent in a defendant's burden to establish the
inconclusiveness or insubstantiality of the evidence under
Kerekes is an obligation to marshal all of the evidence which
supports the jury verdict, then show that the evidence is
insufficient.

In Cambelt International Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d

1239 (Utah 1987), this Court reiterated that:
We consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, and we will not
overturn that verdict when it is supported by
Defendant does not challenge her conviction for distribution
of a controlled substance; consequently, the State will not
address that charge in this brief.
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substantial and competent evidence. Von Hake
v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985).
"To successfully attack the verdict, an
appellant must marshall [sic] all the
evidence supporting their verdict and then
demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to that verdict,
the evidence is insufficient to support it."
Id.
Cambelt, 745 P.2d at 1242. Commenting on that quotation, the
Court added a footnote in which it said:
In Scharf v. BMG Corp.\, 700 P.2d 1068
(Utah 1985)], we stated this standard of
review as it then applied with respect to
findings of fact entered in a judge-tried
civil matter. The promulgation of Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure 52(a), which mandates that
a trial judge's findings of fact "shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous,"
alters this standard somewhat in judge-tried
cases. Still, the standard has continuing
validity in regard to a jury's factual
findings.
Cambelt, 745 P.2d at 1242 n. 1.

While these cases are civil

rather than criminal, the standard is the same for criminal
cases.

The applicability of Rule 52(a) to criminal matters was

explained in State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-93 (Utah 1987),
and the same standard of viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict is also well established in criminal
procedure.

Lamm, 606 P.2d at 231.

In another civil case, this

Court, quoting State v. Walker, recently reiterated the
obligation of an appellant to marshal the evidence in support of
the jury's verdict, then challenge the finding.

In re Estate of

Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989).
Obviously the burden of proof is different between
criminal and civil cases, but that difference in burden does not
affect defendant's obligation to marshal all of the facts
-20-

supporting the jury verdict before attempting to demonstrate that
the evidence is insufficient.

In her brief, defendant mentions

some facts which were adduced at trial but fails to include other
evidence which was presented to the jury and which abundantly
supports the verdict.

That evidence will be pointed out as

applicable in each subpoint hereafter.
The elements of attempt are contained in Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-4-101 (1990).

That section reads:

(1) For purposes of this part a person is
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if,
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise
required for the commission of the offense,
he engages in conduct constituting a
substantial step toward commission of the
offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct
does not constitute a substantial step unless
it is strongly corroborative of the actor's
intent to commit the offense.
Id.

As with all crimes, proving an attempt involves proving a

culpable mental state and proving conduct.

Unlike proof of a

completed crime, the conduct proven must only be conduct
"constituting a substantial step toward commission of [an]
offense," and this conduct must be "strongly corroborative of the
actor's intent to commit the offense."

Id.

This Court explained this statute in State v. Pearson,
680 P.2d 406 (Utah 1984):
The statute adopts the definition of an
"attempt" employed in the Model Penal Code,
§5.01, purposed on drawing the line further
away from the final act and enlarging the
common law concept. It emphasizes what the
accused has done, not what remains to be
done.
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680 P.2d at 408 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).

The

Pearson case involved a defendant who conceded that the intent to
commit the offense was present but that the acts proven "were
preparation and not such as were directed toward actual
commission of the offense."

680 P.2d at 407. This Court

disagreed, stating:
This appears to overlook the fact that the
appellant was on his way to the scene of the
burglary in a chain of events that, but for
the arrest, would have resulted in a breaking
and entering and robbery. The acts in the
process were "conduct constituting a
substantial step toward commission of the
offense" that most certainly "corroborated
the actor's intent to commit the offense,"
which intent the appellant does not deny but
actually confirms.
Id.
In an earlier case, the Court had defined attempt in
the following terms:
An attempt to commit a crime is an act
done with the intent to commit that crime
beyond mere preparation but which falls short
of its actual commission[.]
State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah 1978).

As was stated in

an Idaho case:
The concern of the criminal law is to
determine at which points along a continuum
of activity criminal liability of differing
degrees will attach.
State v. Otto, 102 Idaho 250, 629 P.2d 646, 647 (1981).

The

determination of where, along the continuum between intent to
commit an offense alone and the completion of the offense, an
attempt has been proven is a matter for the trier of fact.
Pearson, 680 P.2d at 408 n. 3 (citing State v. Workman, 90
Wash.2d 443, 584 P.2d 382, 386 (1978)).
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A.

Attempted Murder by Use of Heroin.

Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial
was insufficient to support the charge that she attempted to kill
her husband by administering an overdose of heroin to him.
However, defendant fails to marshal all of the facts which
support the verdict.

Given all of the evidence, the jury

correctly determined that the evidence supported the charge.
Cindy Orozco testified that defendant approached Cindy
about purchasing enough heroin to kill defendant's husband (Tr.
at 401). Defendant originally gave Cindy and Cindy's husband
$300.00 to purchase the heroin, but the Orozcos spent the money
for their own drug habit (Tr. at 404-408).

Subsequently,

defendant gave Cindy another $450.00 to buy the heroin; this
time, the Orozcos bought the drug and gave it to defendant (Tr.
at 411-14).

A few days later, defendant told Cindy that the

heroin had not worked (Tr. at 420-21).
Defendant later told undercover officer Vojtecky about
how she had chopped up the heroin, put it in a capsule, and given
the capsule to Danny.

However, Danny had awakened and vomited

some five hours later; the heroin did not kill him (St. Exh. #11
2
at page 6) . Defendant's statement was corroborated by Danny's
testimony at trial.

He had taken the capsule given him by

defendant the night of January 21-22 and gone to bed (Tr. at 366

In this point regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the
State will cite to the transcript of the trial and to the
transcripts of the tape recorded conversations between defendant
and others. The issues of the admissibility of the conversations
and the sufficiency of the evidence to establish corpus delicti
will be treated in Point II of this brief.
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and 382).

He awoke the next morning about 6:00 to 6:30 and went

to the bathroom, where he vomited (Tr. at 366 and 383).

He

thought that he had the flu because he was dizzy, sweating and
vomiting (Tr. at 383). The facts in the present case demonstrate
that defendant went far beyond mere preparation when she cut up
the heroin and gave it to Danny in a capsule.

Only the fact that

his stomach rejected the drug kept the attempt from becoming a
completed murder.
In her brief, defendant claims that Dr. Stonebraker
testified that the victim's symptoms were not consistent with a
heroin overdose.

No citation is given for that statement and a

review of Dr. Stonebraker's testimony reveals that he never made
such a statement.

Dr. Stonebraker's testimony regarding heroin

consists of a statement that he tested Danny's body fluids for
heroin or its metabolite but did not find them (Tr. at 335). The
traces of heroin would leave the body within 60-90 minutes of its
administration (Tr. at 334-35).

Given the hypothetical, based on

Danny Johnson's testimony and defendant's earlier statements,
that the heroin was taken orally and then vomited some five hours
later, Dr. Stonebraker opined that the heroin would have been
expelled.

That would further lessen the chances of finding

evidence of the heroin in the body fluids (Tr. at 336).
There was other expert testimony which defendant does
not cite which dealt with the effect of oral administration of
heroin.

Dr. Douglas Rawlins, a toxicology expert, testified:
A.
The oral administration of heroin is not
the usual way that it's administered. It's
usually administered intravenously. When
taken orally, it — unless it's taken in

extremely large concentrations — and I
honestly don't know how much you could get
into a — into an ampicillin capsule, whether
there's a large amount or a small amount,
would have to be taken in extremely large
amounts before there would be much in the way
of symptoms.
Q.
What if just one capsule were taken,
what type of symptoms would you expect?
A.
If the symptoms from heroin, if it's
absorbed orally would be one of euphoria.
The person would be somewhat euphoric at the
very onset, followed later by an essentially
central nervous system depression or sleep
and drowsiness.
Q.
Uh-huh. Would the person experience
vomiting, dizziness, those type of things?
A.
Vomiting, probably not. I would guess
not, but I don't know after the oral —
Q.
Dizziness?
A.
Dizziness? Dizziness is not one of the
usual symptoms after heroin ingestion, no.
(Tr. at 479 and 492-93) (emphasis added).

Clearly Dr. Rawlins

did not testify that Danny Johnson's symptoms could not have been
caused by the capsule with heroin that defendant had given him.
Dr. Rawlins testified that he did not know the symptoms after
oral ingestion of heroin.
At best, defendant might claim that there was
contradictory evidence about whether Danny Johnson's symptoms the
morning of January 22 were caused by oral ingestion of heroin.
However,
[t]he existence of contradictory evidence or
of conflicting inferences does not warrant
disturbing the jury's verdict. State v.
Roberts, 91 Utah 117, 63 P.2d 584 (1937). It
is within the exclusive province of the jury
to judge the credibility of the witness and
the weight of the evidence. State v. Wilson,
Utah, 565 P.2d 66 (1977).
State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982).
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The evidence presented at trial was that defendant
purchased heroin with the stated intent of giving an overdose to
her husband.

She later stated that she had chopped up the

heroin, put it in a capsule, and personally given the capsule to
Danny.
heroin.

Five hours later, Danny vomited and rid himself of the
This statement was supported by Danny's testimony that

he had taken the capsule given him by defendant and later become
violently ill.

This evidence demonstrates that defendant went

beyond mere preparation and took a substantial step toward
murdering her husband.

She actually administered the heroin

intending for Danny to overdose.

This evidence amply supports

the jury's verdict convicting defendant of attempted murder by
the administration of heroin.
B.

Attempted Murder by Use of Methamphetamine.

Defendant next claims that the evidence was
insufficient to support the jury's verdict convicting her of
attempted murder by use of methamphetamine.

In State v. Walker,

765 P.2d 874 (Utah 1988), the Court said:
In reviewing the conviction, we do not
substitute our judgment for that of the jury.
"So long as there is some evidence, including
reasonable inferences, from which findings of
all the requisite elements of the crime can
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops."
765 P.2d at 874, (quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah
1985)).

The Court defined "inferences" in Wyatt v. Bauqhman, 121

Utah 98, 239 P.2d 193 (1951), when it said:
We have defined an "inference" as: a logical
and reasonable conclusion of the existence of
a fact in the case, not presented by direct
evidence as to the existence of the fact
itself, but inferred from the establishment
-2fi-

of other facts from which, by the process of
logic and reason, based upon common
experience, the existence of the assumed fact
may be concluded by the trier of the fact.
121 Utah at 109, 239 P.2d at 198-99. The question is, then,
whether evidence of defendant's actions, plus reasonable
inferences therefrom, support the jury's finding that defendant
took a substantial step toward the offense of attempted murder by
use of methamphetamine.
The evidence presented at trial was that defendant
spoke to Cindy Orozco about having a "new idea" when the heroin
did not kill Danny (St. Exh. #7 at page 2).

The next day Cindy

was at defendant's home when defendant asked if Cindy knew where
she could get some "crank," a street name for methamphetamine
(St. Exh. #8-1 at page 3).

Defendant said that she had learned

from a television program that an overdose of methamphetamine can
kill a person (St. Exh. #8-1 at page 4).
see if she could get the crank.

Cindy said she would

Then, after a meeting with

Officer Vojtecky, Cindy went back into defendant's home and asked
how defendant intended to give Danny the crank (St. Exh. #8-1 at
pages 5 and 10)• Defendant responded that she was going to put
the drug in Danny's capsule (St. Exh. #8-1 at page 10).
After discussions with the officers and after helping
Officer Vaughn mix flour and brown sugar to make counterfeit
methamphetamine, Cindy telephoned defendant and told her that
Cindy could get the drug (Tr. at 426 and 109, and St. Exh. #9-1
at page 2).

Cindy asked what Danny's size was in order to

determine how much crank was needed (St. Exh. #9-1 at page 2).
Defendant responded by asking how much the drug was per gram,

then eventually told Cindy Danny's height and weight.

When Cindy

told defendant the crank would cost $500.00, defendant asked for
an hour to think about it (St. Exh. #9-1 at page 3).

When Cindy

called back, defendant said that she wanted the crank but that
she could not get the cash until the next morning (St. Exh. #9-1
at page 4).
The next day, defendant told Cindy that she would bring
the money to Cindy's house; defendant said that defendant's
mother had written a check for the amount and defendant would
cash it (St. Exh. #10 at page 2).

Defendant arrived at Cindy's

house and met Officer Vojtecky who was posing as Cindy's
boyfriend (Tr. at 237-39).

Defendant talked to Cindy and

Vojtecky about whether the crank was bitter and whether she could
put it in Danny's coffee (St. Exh. #11 at pages 1-2 and 4).
Defendant debated about putting the crank in a capsule as she had
done with the heroin, but finally decided to put it in Danny's
coffee (St. Exh. #11 at pages 4, 6 and 8).

Vojtecky told

defendant point blank that the crank would kill Danny and asked
if she wanted to kill him.
Exh. #11 at 9).

Defendant replied that she did (St.

During this meeting, defendant gave Vojtecky

$500.00 for the drug (Tr. at 239-40).
That evening, Cindy telephoned defendant and told her
that they had the methamphetamine (Tr. at 241). At approximately
8:45 p.m., Vojtecky and Cindy met with defendant at an old
Highway Patrol weigh station and gave defendant the counterfeit
drug (Tr. at 241, 244-47, and 425-26; St. Exh. #12). When
defendant left the meeting place, she was stopped and arrested by
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other officers about two miles down the road.

Those officers,

and later Vojtecky, searched the car and were unable to find the
counterfeit drug (Tr. at 269-71 and 295-98).

The evidence showed

that the area between where defendant received the counterfeit
methamphetamine and where she was stopped was grassy, extensively
traveled by vehicles, and that there were people walking in the
area as well (Tr. at 297). The fact that the counterfeit
substance was not found does not negate the testimony of Officer
Vojtecky and Cindy that the substance was handed to defendant.
The evidence clearly established defendant's intent and
preparation to use methamphetamine to kill her husband.

Beyond

that, the evidence demonstrates that defendant took substantial
steps to that end by giving $500.00 to Vojtecky to purchase the
methamphetamine, then obtaining what she thought was the drug
from Vojtecky.

State v. Reese, 1988 WL 1556 (Ohio App. 1988)

(unpublished).

The evidence is not so insubstantial or

inconclusive as to raise a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt;
therefore, the jury's verdict should be affirmed.
C.

Attempted Murder by Use of Oxalic Acid.

Finally, defendant claims that her conviction for
attempted murder by use of oxalic acid is not based upon
sufficient evidence.

The same legal standards delineated above

apply to this argument, and again, the evidence clearly supports
the jury's verdict.
On January 29, 1988, defendant told Cindy that
defendant had put M[a] whole bottle" of oxalic acid in Danny's
capsules (St. Exh. #8-1 at page 4).

At the same time, defendant

showed Cindy the bottle of oxalic acid, which defendant kept
under the kitchen sink (Tr. at 428-29).

The next day, defendant

also told Vojtecky (acting as Cindy's boyfriend) that, in the
last month, she had given Danny nearly a whole bottle of the
substance (St. Exh. #11 at page 4-5). In fact, Danny was still
taking the capsules which had oxalic acid in them (St. Exh. #11
at page 5 ) .
Defendant's statements about administering the oxalic
acid to Danny was verified when officers seized the bottle of the
substance from under defendant's kitchen sink (Tr. at 219-20).
Officers also retrieved Danny's bottle of capsules from the bar
owned by defendant (Tr. at 209-10).

These bottle and capsules

were taken to the Weber State Crime Lab for testing (Tr. at 161).
While the capsules were marked ampicillin, the substance inside
was not ampicillin; the substance tested to be the same as that
found in the oxalic acid bottle (Tr. at 164-69).

Oxalic acid

occurs naturally in the body but is a poison if too much is
ingested (Tr. at 171-72 and 333-34).
Further corroboration of defendant's statement about
giving Danny oxalic acid came from his testimony.

The victim

testified that his first prescription had not caused any problems
but that the capsules in the refill had given him stomach cramps,
a burning in his esophagus, and weakness (Tr. at 364-65 and 37073).
Defendant introduced evidence in an attempt to dispute
the findings that the capsules contained oxalic acid (Tr. at 48286 and 334-35).

As noted above:

The existence of contradictory evidence or of
conflicting inferences does not warrant
disturbing the jury's verdict. State v.
Roberts, 91 Utah 117, 63 P.2d 584 (1937).
Howell, 649 P.2d at 97. The same standard should be applied to
the victim's testimony that defendant had not "come out and
sa[id] that she was going to kill" him (Tr. at 369). When Mr.
Johnson's recollection was refreshed by a transcript of a
conversation he had with officers, Mr. Johnson tempered his
statement with, "She might have said it at one time, and like I
said, in the last two years I cannot recall.
saying she wished I was dead once."

I remember her

(Tr. at 370). The jury

correctly performed its duty and resolved any apparent conflicts
in the evidence.
The evidence produced from defendant's statements,
corroborated by the bottle of oxalic acid shown to Cindy and
seized by the officers, and corroborated by the presence of
oxalic acid in the victim's capsules, amply supports the jury's
verdict.

No reasonable person would have had a reasonable doubt

that defendant took substantial steps to kill her husband by
giving him capsules filled with oxalic acid.
POINT II
DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE
THE ADMISSION OF HER PRETRIAL STATEMENTS BY
FAILING TO OBJECT TO THEIR ADMISSION IN A
TIMELY FASHION. SECONDLY, CORPUS DELICTI WAS
PROPERLY ESTABLISHED EITHER UNDER THE
TRADITIONAL RULE OR UNDER THE FEDERAL RULE.
Defendant's second claim of error is that the State
did not prove the corpus delicti of the crimes.

She begins her

argument on this point by stating, "Before the inculpatory

statements of a defendant may be introduced as evidence[,] the
State must prove the existence of a corpus delicti."
Appellant [hereinafter Br. of App.] at 18).

(Brief of

This aspect of the

corpus delicti rule is clearly an admissibility question, and, as
such, is subject to the waiver doctrine.

This brief will address

first the admissibility-of-the-statements prong of the corpus
delicti, then it will address the sufficiency-to-establishcorpus-delicti issue.
A.

Waiver.

While Utah cases have not squarely addressed the issue
of waiver in the corpus delicti area, the rule is clearly
established that:
[a] general rule of appellate review in
criminal cases in Utah is that a
contemporaneous objection or some form of
specific preservation of claims of error must
be made a part of the trial court record
before an appellate court will review such
claim on appeal.
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987) (footnote
omitted).

Thus, in general, a defendant has waived the right to

object to the admission of evidence if he or she did not raise a
timely objection to admission at trial.
Other jurisdictions have determined that the waiver
doctrine is applicable to the admissibility issue under the
corpus delicti rule.

In Spright v. State, 254 Ind. 420, 260

N.E.2d 770, 772-73 (1970), the Indiana Supreme Court held that
defendant had waived his right to object to the admission of his
alleged confession by failing to object to its admission at
trial.

See also Finchum v. State, 463 N.E.2d 304, 306 (Ind.App.1

Dist. 1984); People v, Miles, 77 Cal. Rptr. 89, 93 (Cal.App. 4
Dist. 1969); Pullin v. State, 257 Ga. 815, 364 S.E.2d 848, 851
(1988).

Contra People v. Davis, 173 Ill.App.3d 300, 527 N.E.2d

552, 554 (Ill.App. 1 Dist.), appeal denied, 535 N.E.2d 455
(1988).

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine addressed the same

issue in State v. Sheehan, 337 A.2d 253, 254 (Me. 1975), and
determined to address the issue for manifest error since Sheehan
had not objected at trial to the admission of his confession.
That court found that there was no manifest error but reversed
the conviction on other grounds.
The record of the present case clearly shows that
defendant never objected to the introduction of any of the tape
recorded conversations (Tr. at 126-38).

Neither did defendant

raise the issue of corpus delicti until a memorandum in support
of a motion for new trial was filed well after the trial (R. at
312-21).

Because defendant did not timely object to the

admission of her recorded conversations, she has waived the right
to raise the issue on appeal.
B.

The Applicability of Corpus Delicti to Pre-Crime
Statements.

Even if this Court were to overlook defendant's waiver
on the corpus delicti issue, the conviction should still be
affirmed on the merits of the question.

Defendant's statements

were properly admitted as either not falling under the corpus
delicti rule, or as admissible under the trustworthiness version
of the corpus delicti rule.

The applicability of the different

versions of the corpus delicti rule will be addressed in subpoint
C.
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Although there is no Utah case law on this issue, some
commentators and courts have determined that neither the
traditional corpus delicti rule nor the federal corpus delicti
rule (as described in subpoint C below) applies to "statements,
inconsistent with innocence, made by the accused before the crime
was committed."

Perkins, The Corpus Delicti of Murder, 48 Va. L.

Rev. 173, 178 (1962).

This position was stated in Warszower v.

United States, 312 U.S. 342 (1941):
The rule requiring corroboration of
confessions protects the administration of
the criminal law against errors in
convictions based upon untrue confessions
alone. Where the inconsistent statement was
made prior to the crime this danger does not
exist. Therefore we are of the view that
such admissions do not need to be
corroborated. They contain none of the
inherent weaknesses of confessions or
admissions after the fact.
312 U.S. at 347.

Castillo v. State, 614 P.2d 756, 759 (Alaska

1980) (citing Perkins and Warszower).

Although this language in

Warszower (paraphrased in Castillo) seems to imply that any
statements made before a crime was allegedly committed are
sufficient to convict without a determination of corpus delicti,
both cases also imply a determination that a crime had occurred.
Warszower was a case involving the obtaining of a passport by use
of false statements; the prosecution had used defendant's
previous inconsistent statements to prove that the statements
made to obtain the passport were false.

In Castillo, the

appellate court found that the State had established sufficient
corpus delicti to sustain a murder conviction by coupling
defendant's pre-crime threats toward the victim with the evidence

of a fight between defendant and the victim.

Defendant's post-

crime statement that he had thrown the victim from a bridge (the
body was not found) was supported by the futile attempts by
family and authorities to find the victim.

The language

regarding the reliance on pre-crime statements being more
trustworthy may lessen the degree of proof necessary to establish
that a crime has been committed but may not negate it altogether.
The very term "pre-crime statements" appears to presuppose the
existence of some evidence that a crime has been committed;
however, it may be that the quantum of evidence to trigger the
use of pre-crime statements may not be as great as that required
to corroborate post-crime confessions or admissions.
In the present case, there are two situations of precrime statements by defendant.

One is the statement to Cindy

that defendant wanted to purchase heroin to administer an
overdose to defendant's husband (Tr. at 401). This occurred
before the crime of attempted murder by actually administering
the heroin to the victim.

The other statement is that made to

Cindy and Vojtecky that defendant wanted to purchase
methamphetamine to kill her husband (St. Exh. #11 at page 9).
This statement occurred before the actual purchase of the
counterfeit drug which constituted a substantial step toward the
crime of murder.

While, as is argued below, there is sufficient

evidence to establish the corpus delicti for the heroin charge
and the oxalic acid charge even under the traditional rule, the
evidence under the traditional rule does not so clearly support
corpus delicti for the methamphetamine count.
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However, under the

arguably relaxed rule stated in Warszowery the evidence of the
purchase of the methamphetamine should be sufficient to remove
defendant's pre-crime statement regarding her intent in
purchasing the methamphetamine from the purview of the corpus
delicti rule.
C.

Sufficiency of Evidence to Prove Corpus Delicti,

Even though defendant has waived the right to object to
the admission of her tape recorded conversations, defendant asks
this Court to address the question of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a finding that corpus delicti was
established.

This differs from the issue in Point I of this

brief which was the question of sufficiency of the evidence to
support defendant's convictions.

The argument in that point

included the statements by defendant in demonstrating that the
evidence was sufficient to support the convictions.

In this

point, the argument focuses on whether there was sufficient
evidence to establish corpus delicti without the statements.
While defendant has phrased this issue in terms of a
trial court's determination that the State had proven corpus
delicti, that is not correct.

In fact, in response to

defendant's post-trial motion for new trial or, in the
alternative, for dismissal, the trial court found that the tape
recorded conversations of defendant did not fall within the
purview of the corpus delicti rule (R. at 337-31; a copy of the
memorandum decision and order are attached as Addendum B).

On

the basis of memoranda submitted by counsel for both parties and
argument at a hearing on the motion, the trial court determined
that:

the State vs. Weldon case cited by Defendant
(314 P.2d 353 [1957]) does not extend the
Corpus Delecti [sic] Rule as it relates to
confessions made by the Defendant to all
statements made by the Defendant.
In this case, the now objected to
statements were made in connection with the
activity itself, not after arrest and were
not introduced in the form of a confession
but to show a motive and intent at the time
other actions were taking place. It is the
judgment of this Court that such statements
are admissible as part of the case in chief
and may be used to show Corpus Delecti [sic].
(R. at 328). This legal conclusion by the trial court must be
reviewed under the correction of error standard set forth in City
of Monticello v. Christensen, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah March 2,
1990).

In that case, this Court said:
we accord a lower court's statement of the
law, . . . or legal conclusion no particular
deference, but review it for correctness.

Id. at 6.
The trial court did not cite to any cases in support of
its finding that the corpus delicti rule is not applicable to
defendant's statements made during the course of the crime. Most
of the case law in this area deals specifically with confessions
and admissions which are made post-crime and post-arrest, or, at
the very least, when a defendant knows that he or she is the
focus of an investigation.

The case law speaks of the corpus

delicti rule in terms of statements made to authority figures
which a defendant knows to be such.
While the trial court did not articulate support for
its decision regarding statements made in the course of the
criminal activity, some tangential support for that proposition
is found in case law in Utah and elsewhere.
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See generally

Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1316-26 (1956).

This Court, in State v.

Karumai, 101 Utah 592, 126 P.2d 1047 (1942), defined the
difference between confessions and admissions:
A confession is the admission of guilt by
the defendant of all the necessary elements
of the crime of which he is charged,
including the necessary acts and intent. An
admission merely admits some fact which
connects or tends to connect the defendant
with the offense but not with all the
elements of the crime.
126 P.2d at 1052 (citations omitted).

In the context of the

voluntariness of a confession, the Court in Karumai stated that
it was not necessary to make a preliminary showing of
voluntariness before receiving an admission, as opposed to a
confession.

See also State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P.2d

1010, 1013 (1938).

Thus, the trial court in the instant case has

support in finding that the statements and admissions made by
defendant can be treated differently from an extrajudicial
confession.

As is noted in subpoint B above, statements and

admissions made in the context of the commission of the crime do
not have the untrustworthiness which the corpus delicti rule was
formulated to combat.

See also State v. Saltzman, 241 Iowa 1373,

44 N.W.2d 24, 27-29 (1950) (statements made during commission of
the crime are part of the res gestae and not subject to the
corpus delicti rule).

On the other hand, the United States

Supreme Court has stated that out-of-court statements by a
defendant which show essential elements of the crime have the
same possibilities for error as confessions.

Hence, the Court

said, such statements also must be corroborated.
States 348 U.S. 84, 91 (1954).

Opper v. United

The Utah cases cited in

appellant's and this brief all deal with post-crime and postarrest confessions by defendants. As such, they clearly fall
within the traditional rule for establishing corpus delicti.
There does not seem to be any case law which directly
addresses the applicability of the corpus delicti rule to
statements made by a defendant during the course of a crime.
However, the trial court encountered the problems which arise
when the traditional corpus delicti rule is applied to attempt
crimes as will be discussed below.

His ruling was an effort to

address these problems. As set out hereafter, these problems can
be resolved by an analysis of, and adoption of, a trustworthiness
approach to the corpus delicti rule. When this approach is used,
the defendant's statements in the present case were correctly
admitted.
The corpus delicti rule has not reached the stature of
a constitutional protection.
F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1976).

See Aschmeller v. South Dakota, 534

It is a rule which arose in English

common law to reduce "the possibility of punishing a person for a
crime which was never in fact committed[.]"
Substantive Criminal Law 24 (1986).

1 W. LaFave,

Corpus delicti "is an

evidentiary principle requiring the prosecution to produce
sufficient evidence to establish that a crime has been
committed."

Veldorale, The Principle of Corpus Delicti and the

Evidence Pertaining Thereto, 39 Temple Law Quarterly 1, 2 (1965).
In City of Bremerton v. Corbett, 106 Wash.2d 569, 723
P.2d 1135 (1986), the Washington Supreme Court explained the
corpus delicti rule as follows:

The rule requiring independent
corroboration of extrajudicial confessions
and admissions is one of the oldest
confession doctrines.

The corpus delicti rule was established by
the courts to protect a defendant from the
possibility of an unjust conviction based
upon a false confession alone.. . . It arose
from judicial distrust of confessions
generally, coupled with recognition that
juries are likely to accept confessions
uncritically.. . . This distrust stems from
the possibility that the confession may have
been misreported or misconstrued, elicited by
force or coercion, based upon mistaken
perception of the facts or law, or falsely
given by a mentally disturbed individual.
. . . Thus, it is clear that the corpus
delicti rule was established to prevent not
only the possibility that a false confession
was secured by means of police coercion or
abuse but also the possibility that a
confession, though voluntarily given, is
false.
723 P.2d at 1139 (citations omitted).
Three approaches have developed in American law to the
corroboration requirement first found in the English common law.
The majority of American jurisdictions
follow a formulation of the corpus delicti
rule which requires that there be
corroborative evidence, independent of the
defendant's confession, which tends to prove
the commission of the crime charged.. . .
Under this approach, the independent evidence
is sufficient only if it "touches or concerns
the corpus delicti."

The second identifiable approach to this
question is actually an extension of the
above-stated rule. While the majority
position requires that there be some
independent proof touching upon the corpus
delicti, a few cases have held that the
corroboration must consist of substantial
evidence, independent of the accused's

confession, which tends to establish each and
every element of the crime.

The third approach to the corpus delicti
issue has been denominated the
"trustworthiness" version of corroboration
and is generally followed by the federal
courts and an increasing number of states.
Under this rule, "[t]here is no necessity
that [the] proof [independent of the
defendant's confession] touch the corpus
delicti at all.. . . [P]roof of any
corroborating circumstances is adequate which
goes to fortify the truth of the confession
or tends to prove facts embraced in the
confession."
State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 222, 337 S.E.2d 487, 491-92 (1985)
(citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting
Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. at 92).
It is unclear which version of the corpus delicti rule
Utah follows.

It appears that this Court has never before been

asked to address itself to the distinctions between the different
approaches.

In State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P.2d 1010

(1938), a woman was convicted of murdering her newborn child.
Her conviction was based on her confession to the "county
physician" that she had placed her hand over the child's mouth
and nose and smothered it.

The conviction was reversed because

the Court found that there was insufficient evidence to prove the
corpus delicti and render the confession admissible.

In that

case, this Court said:
We adhere to the doctrine that there must be
independent proof of the corpus delicti
before the confession can be received for the
consideration of the jury[.]
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[The State must prove three elements before a
conviction may stand. These elements are:]
(1) That a wrong, an injury, or a damage has
been done; (2) that such was effected by a
criminal agency, i. e., without right or by
unlawful means; (3) that the accused
perpetrated the wrong, or aided or abetted
therein, i. e., that accused was the guilty
agent. A confession . . . serves as
evidence, and if believed, as sufficient
proof of the third point of proof, the
identity of the guilty agent. It may also
according to the language used be evidence of
either or both of the first and second points
to be proved. But the law . . . has wisely
declared that there must be independent
evidence of the first and second points,
commonly called the corpus delicti.
83 P.2d at 1014.

Language in that case also seems to support the

trustworthiness approach, later adopted in the federal system,
when the Court said:
[C]orroborative evidence must consist of
facts or circumstances appearing in evidence
independent of the confession and consistent
therewith, tending to confirm and strengthen
the confession.
83 P.2d at 1016 (emphasis added).

The burden of proving corpus

delicti was later stated to be the "clear and convincing
evidence" standard.

State v. Ferry, 2 Utah 2d 371, 275 P.2d 173

(1954); State v. Cooley, 603 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979); State v.
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 478 (Utah 1988).
Subsequently, in State v. Weldon, 6 Utah 2d 372, 314
P.2d 353 (1957), this Court again defined the corpus delicti rule
in a manner very similar to the federal "trustworthiness"
approach.

The Court said:
The purpose of the rule was to safeguard
against convicting the innocent on the
strength of false confessions.
• • •

Though the rule was extended to apply to
other crimes [i.e., other than murder], in
practical application the courts have
attempted to hold it within the bounds of
reason consistent with its original purpose
of guarding against convicting the innocent
and so that it is not applied to create a
device for protecting defendants who reek
with guilt.

[T]he generally accepted view, to which we
give our approval, is that the evidence
independent of the confession need not
establish the corpus delicti by separate,
full or positive proof, and that the whole
evidence, including the confession, may be
considered together in determining whether
the corpus delicti has been satisfactorily
established.

[T]he rule best suited to the administration
of justice is that there must be substantial
separate evidence of the corpus delicti, such
that reasonable minds could believe that the
crime is a real one which was in fact
committed, and not one which is fanciful or
imaginary.
314 P.2d at 354-57 (footnotes omitted).

See also State v.

Cazier, 521 P.2d 554, 555 (Utah 1974) (corpus delicti does not
require proof of every element of the offense); State v. Petree,
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983) (corpus delicti requires only that
the State present evidence (1) that the injury specified in the
crime occurred, and (2) that such injury was caused by someone's
criminal conduct).
These cases deal with the standard corpus delicti
question, namely that the injury specified in the crime occurred
and the injury was caused by someone's criminal conduct.
Problems arise when, as in the present case, the injury or wrong
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has not occurred but has merely been attempted.

Courts (although

not in Utah) and commentators have addressed the applicability of
the traditional corpus delicti rule in conspiracy and attempt
situations.

For example, one commentator has said:

It is equally clear that where an offense
contains no result element, such as is true
of conspiracies or attempts for example,
neither the corpus delicti concept, nor the
reappearing victim rationale is at all
relevant since the burning of the building,
or similar result, is not even alleged.
Despite this, the requirement of corpus
delicti corroboration has been extended in
most jurisdictions to offenses without result
elements.
Note, Confession Corroboration in New York:

A Replacement for

the Corpus Delicti Rule, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 1205, 1214 (1978).
See also City of Bremerton v. Corbett, 723 P.2d at 1140 (because
of criticism of the corpus delicti rule, "the federal courts and
a growing number of state courts have opted for a more flexible
rule for corroborating confessions than the rigid rule requiring
independent proof of all elements of the corpus delicti").
In the well-reasoned case of State v. Parker, 315 N.C.
222, 337 S.E.2d 487 (1985), the North Carolina Supreme Court
abandoned its adherence to "our strict rule requiring independent
proof of the corpus delicti in order to guard against the
possibility that a defendant will be convicted of a crime that
has not been committed."

337 S.E.2d at 494. The North Carolina

court spoke of the confusion and complexity engendered by the
strict corpus delicti rule and the "varying and inconsistent
interpretations" given the rule.

337 S.E.2d at 492.

In

addition, defining corpus delicti has become more complex as

statutory law has become more extensive, precise and detailed.
337 S.E.2d at 493. The court then said:
Finally, we note that a strict application
of the corpus delicti rule is nearly
impossible in those instances where the
defendant has been charged with a crime that
does not involve a tangible corpus delicti
such as is present in homicide (the dead
body), arson (the burned building) and
robbery (missing property). Examples of
crimes which involve no tangible injury that
can be isolated as a corpus delicti include
certain "attempt" crimes, conspiracy and
income tax evasion.. . . The difficulty of
applying the traditional corpus delicti rule
of corroboration to these offenses may, in
part, account for the shift in emphasis to a
rule requiring corroboration of each
essential element of the crime charged.
Perceiving this trend toward a broad
interpretation of the corpus delicti, one
author notes that:
[T]he corpus delicti rule . . . is
periodically misapplied, and its emphasis
on the elements of the crime charged as
opposed to the reliability of the
confession has caused several courts and
commentators to question the extent to
which the corpus delicti version serves
its original purposes, and to prefer the
alternative trustworthiness version.
337 S.E.2d at 493 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original)
(quoting Note, 46 Fordham L. Rev. at 1216).

In adopting the

trustworthiness of the confession rule, the North Carolina court
noted that:
an increasing number of courts have become
satisfied that the possibility of convicting
a person for a crime which was not in fact
committed may be adequately guarded against
by requiring only that the prosecution
produce evidence which corroborates "the
essential facts admitted [in the defendant's
confession] sufficiently to justify a jury
inference of their truth."
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337 S.E.2d at 493-94 (quoting United States v, Johnson, 589 F.2d
716, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).

North Carolina joined a "nearly

unanimous" majority of federal courts, and state courts in
Hawaii, Illinois, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin in adopting the
corroboration-of-the-confession rule.

The court found that that

approach assuaged the specific concerns underlying the corpus
delicti requirement.

337 S.E.2d at 494-95.

In the case now before this Court, this Court should
apply a corroboration-of-the-confession, or trustworthiness
standard.

As defendant's crimes were attempts, there is no

murder and, thus, no body to establish that a murder occurred.
The purposes of the corpus delicti rule are satisfied, however,
by establishing that defendant's statements are trustworthy and
that the crimes of attempted murder did occur.

This approach

does not depart drastically from this Court's previous case law.
As was noted above, this Court has never been asked to address
the different approaches to the corpus delicti rule;
consequently, no real analysis of the different approaches has
been made.

The Johnson and Weldon cases cited above seem to

apply both the strict and the trustworthiness approaches.

Since

the present case does not deal with a completed crime, this Court
may refrain from addressing which approach should be utilized in
future cases involving completed crimes.

However, where, as in

this case, the crimes involve attempts, this Court should avail
itself of the opportunity to address the problem of the corpus
delicti rule in attempt situations.

Where there is "no tangible

injury," a "strict application of the corpus delicti rule is

nearly impossible-"

State v. Parker, 337 S.E.2d at 493. This

near impossibility and the purposes of the corpus delicti rule
can be addressed by adoption of the trustworthiness approach in
attempt crimes. As discussed below, when the trustworthiness
approach is followed in the instant case, the corpus delicti rule
is satisfied.
With respect to the charge of attempted murder by use
of heroin, defendant's statements about her attempt to kill her
husband were corroborated by other evidence at trial.

The

statements about the substantial steps which defendant took
toward completing the crime were corroborated by Cindy Orozco's
testimony that defendant gave Cindy the money to purchase heroin,
then obtained that heroin after Cindy had purchased it (Tr. at
404-19, 578-80, and 616-19).

Further corroboration of

defendant's statements came when her husband testified that he
had accepted a capsule from defendant on the night of January 2122, 1988, and five hours later, he awoke, very ill. He vomited
and was dizzy and sweating (Tr. at 366-83).
The trustworthiness of defendant's statements in the
charge of attempted murder by use of oxalic acid was also
corroborated.

Defendant's statements about the substantial steps

which she took to try to kill her husband by giving him
sufficient poison was supported by other testimony at trial.
Danny Johnson testified that his original prescription of
ampicillin had not caused him any problems but that when
defendant told him that she had gotten a generic refill of the
capsules, the pills caused stomach cramps, weakness and a burning
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sensation in his esophagus (Tr. at 363-73).

Further

corroboration came from the testimony of officers who found the
bottle of oxalic acid under defendant's kitchen sink and seized
the ampicillin capsules from the victim.

The capsules contained

the same substance as that found in the bottle (Tr. at 165-69 and
219-20).

Danny's symptoms and the doctored capsules strongly

corroborated defendant's statements regarding the steps she had
taken to kill her husband by administering oxalic acid to him.
The charge of attempted murder by use of
methamphetamine is not as easily corroborated, mainly because
defendant was not allowed to take the step of administering the
supposed drug to her husband.

It could be argued that the

evidence independent of defendant's statements would only support
a verdict that defendant purchased a substance which she thought
was a controlled substance.
However, under the trustworthiness approach to the
corpus delicti requirement, defendant's conviction for this count
should also be upheld.

The circumstances of the statements made

by defendant, coupled with the corroborated statements of her
other attempts to kill her husband, support a finding that
defendant's statements that her intent was to kill her husband
with the methamphetamine were trustworthy.

Since her statements

were shown to be trustworthy, corpus delicti has been established
and the statements were correctly admitted.
The State urges this Court to review the strict corpus
delicti rule as it applies to crimes, such as attempt, where
there is no "result" element.

Since in attempt crimes there may

be no injury or wrong which can be independently proven,
corroboration of the reliability of the confession or statement
of a defendant should be sufficient to support a conviction.

As

the North Carolina Supreme Court determined in Parker, the
trustworthiness approach accomplishes the stated purposes of the
corpus delicti rule, and can reach crimes which do not have an
observable wrong or injury.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

2ci - day of May, 1990.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Suspect:

Peggy Johnson

Undercover:

Cindy and Steve

Knock - knock
Peggy:

Who is it?

noise
Cindy:

So, what's happening?

Having a hard day or vftiat, here?

Peggy:
Cindy:

You're going to start what?

Peggy:
Cindy:

....what's this for, your business?

Peggy:

.... I haven't seen him in three months....around 500 bucks.

Cindy:

Is that right?

Peggy:

....mailed out by Monday.

Cindy:

And that's
what you gotta do, like every quarter of the year, or
sorrethin', is that what it is?

Peggy:

Yea. They tax ya on all the stuff that you buy
on

they don't tax ya

I've got to pay taxes on it. Every year.

Cindy:

Wsll, want some coffee or something?

Peggy:

No.

Cindy:

Got burned out with coffee, huh?

Peggy:

No, I've only had one cup today.

Cindy:

Oh, is that right? You don't drink very much, do you?

Peggy:

Coffee?

Cindy:

Uh-huh.

Peggy:

Yea, I drink about four pots a day.

Cindy:
Peggy:

Oh, do you really? (Yeah) I didn't think you drank that much.
No, but at night I get so exhausted I put
in it so my stomach
don't get upset.

Cindy:

Oh, really.

Peggy:

VJhat do you think? "Can you mix it in coffee or anything, do you think?

Cindy:

I don't know about that.

So he's able to handle that or vfriat?

page z
Cindy:

Ah, I don't think so. I've never really tasted it. Ya know.
wake him up and we can ask him.

Peggy:

I'm wondering if its bitter.

Cindy:

I'd assume it would.

Peggy:

That's what ws done on the other.

Cindy:

You borrowed the money from your Mom? (inaudible response) Well, I
don't know. I think, ah, I don't know. I can ask Steve. Do you want
me to ask him?

Peggy:

He'll think I'm kind-a weird. Did you have fun last night?

Cindy:

You don't know about him. (laughter) I think he's. .WJ.. ?i"!:~X .. f-tClST
WDrry about it, til, I mean, all night, then I had to go pick the kids
up this norning and then I brought em hone and I, then I just told him
"Here, take sane money and get the hell out of here. And go down to the
mall or go to the show or v^a£ever." I still haven't had no God-damned
sleep, ya know.5^ T. .that's &ry~, huh?

Peggy:

<£ ean- i»aef«e wfey youLre ti^ed.

Cindy:

So, ah, don't you think that if you put enough crank in Danny's body it
would kill him. What did that TV thing say?

Peggy:

It just said that it could, but I don't know how much they nean. If you
take it all the time, all the time, every day, keep goin1, if that's
what they meant or what.

Cindy:

Okay, so if
if we get it cause the guy is already on his way, ya
know, that's whv I keen oallin him, ya know. Cause I have seen those
in
,
ne * s bringin' it right up, ya know. And he's just
gonna bring it up to you cause I know
gone very long. But how
are you gonna.;........?

Peggy:

I don't know.

Cindy:

Well, it's just like powder.

Peggy:

Yea, I know it's powder, but how much quantity is it?

Cindy:

Wall, probably, vreli, a quarter ounce.

Peggy:

I don't know a quarter ounce, but

Cindy:

Okay, you know...

Peggy:

The only thing I've ever....is that it was folded in blue and white paper
and they folded it in half, ya know.

Cindy:

Okay, those wsre probably like quarter grams or something, okay. You're
talking quantity, okay? (Okay.) A quarter ounce is quite a bit. It's
quite a bit, ya know.

Lifts

I can

I'm wondering if it will work

See I borrowsd this from my Mom.

o L;7ck a~< r*«- )*u o/.v.

That's why I wondered how much does it look like it is?

Peggy:

Alright, a measuring cup.

Cindy:

Probably about a fourth of a cup. Somev*iere probably between an eighth
of a cup and a fourth....it's a quarter ounce of anything.

(inaudible voices from far away)
Cindy

We had a hard night last night.

Steve

last night?

Peggy

I tried.

Cindy

We had a good tine.
You'll have to excuse us if we look a little rough,

(laughter)

Peggy

He's never hung around.....'?*V?\or anything?

Cindy

Cfa no. He's from Salt Lake.

Peggy

Okay

Cindy

No! No, no, no, uh-uh! No, no. He's-aet affiliated. •fi/C/./'.°.//..alot.

He doesn't work at the base or nuthin'?

Peggy

.guy. He's really good friends with him?

Cindy

I doubt that. I mean, I doubt that. He don't relate to a^y-

Peggy
Cindy

Is Fred the one that's the Highway Patrolman?

Peggy

Ljfcz . . . .

Cindy
Peggy

all the attorneys and stuff like that

Cindy

Not any more, they're not.

Peggy

Aren't they?

Cindy

No. All there are anynore are..'
\".... and superiors. And Steve
knows a few of them, ya know, but ya know, it's only a few of them.

Peggy:

They even stopped at the bar one day when Fred was up there

Steve:

I'm sorry, I missed vrtiat you ware saying there.

Cindy:

Oh, I was just telling her....she said you looked familiar, did you wsrk
at Hill Field or anything and I said no.

Peggy:

Never been in Willard, I take it?

j?;

Cindy:

Except last night

Peggy:

That's the third time, (laughter) Willardn's a one time thing. I mean
Willard's such a fun place.

Cindy:

that's how I met him. From when I was married to Tyke, ya know,
wall that's why I said you didn't have to WDrry, ya know, about him being
cool
If you catch my drift.

Peggy:

Is ..9T??.*... bitter?

Steve:

Yea, a little bit.

Peggy:

So you couldn't put it in coffee or anything?

Steve:

No, what, does he put cream or sugar or anything like that in the coffee?

Peggy:

No.

Steve:

Oh, that

Peggy:

Yea.

Cindy:

He doesn't care. He isn't -gonna know. He don't care.

Is that v*iat you want to do? er?

(laughter)

Steve: Now, how big is he? er?
Peggy:

He's 170 pounds. Hey, have you told him what I've tried?

Cindy:

Uh-uh. Tell him. Go ahead and tell him.

Peggy:

Alright. I've tried - have you ever heard of automat acid?

Steve:

Ah,

Peggy:

It's like..

Steve:

Ah, is it....

Peggy:

No, it's crystal. I've tried that. I've tried (laughter) ah,

Steve:

tried

P^-%%^

...put it in his capsules...

Steve:

Did you put it in capsules?

Peggy:

Yup. Didn't work.

Steve:

How much did you put in?

Peggy:

So far, in the last month he's taken almost a whole bottle. Hasn't wDrked.

Steve:

Is that a pint, or a quart?

Peggy:

No. It's like this. About that big around.

Steve:

Alright. When was the last time you gave him some of that?

Peggy:

He's still takin' em.

Steve:

What do ya nean? He's already had some of that? You gave him some of
that today already?

Peggy:

Yea. He takes his pills every day.

Steve:

just give it to him with his pills?

Peggy:

Yea. He takes four different kinds of pills every day.

Steve:

And you put soire of that in one of those?

Peggy:

No

c.Wj :

Three out of the four.... (laughter)

Peggy:

And he takes twD of them pills a day.

Steve:

What's happened to him because of that? Does he -

Peggy:

Nothing. What's that stuff that kills mice?^ ;rx '

Steve:

Poison...

Peggy:

Ya know them little things - ya know, that little box -

Cindy:

A trap?

Peggy:

Oh, a box of Deoon. Didn't do a thing to him.

Steve:

You gave him a whole box of Decon?

Peggy:

Uh-huh.

Steve:

Was that recently?

Peggy:

Yes. He

In capsules, (laughter) ...during the vfoole month.

Didn't do a thing. And then a whole capsule full of -

I don't know what you call it...black pa*%y stuff.
Cindy:

The heroine.

Peggy:

Heroine. A vfaole -

Cindy:

A gram.

Steve:

Man. What does he - has he

Peggy:

He drinks alot.

Steve:

Well, the crank can do it. I mean, if you want him dead, the crank will do it.

Peggy:

Yea, but shouldn't heroine too?

Steve:

Ah,

water, or something?

.A'v.

/

pa^c u

Cindy:

See, we was talkin 1 and vrtiat we figured was probably vAien he vomited,
cause remember - you told me - t e l l him vfaat happened.

Peggy:

Alright. He had it in his system for five hours. Then he just got up
and got sick like he had the flu, and just kept on throwing up.

Steve:

Yea, that' s
alot of heroine inside of ya
your stomach
upset and throw it up. You're lucky if you throw it up. Now, when
did you give him the heroine?

Peggy:

Two weeks ago.

Cindy:

It was the 21st, wasn't it?

Peggy:

Yea.

Steve:

When did - did you put that in a capsule?

Peggy:

Uh-huh.

Steve:

Then how do you know he took that particular capsule?

Peggy:

Because I gave it to him. (laughter)

Steve:

Oh, okay.

Peggy:

I got home that night and I chopped it all up real fine, put it in a
capsule, and then WDke him up and said, "Here, take your pill" and
(laughter) he

Steve:

That'd be a big pill.

Peggy:

No.

Cindy:

I thought....

Peggy:

No. It was only about like that. I took a razor and I cut it up and
put it in a capsule. Gof a little f'?Wj. pin, and put it in the capsule
and everything.

Steve:

You put a safety pin in the capsule?

Peggy:

Oh no. I didn't want to touch the . .e.r???*~ks I put it in. I had my
rubber gloves on and everything and it was really simple.

Steve:

And vrtiat time did you wake him up?

Peggy:

He woke up by himself at six o'clock.

Steve:

At night?

Peggy:

No.

Cindy:

So that was like five hours, huh?

It was last Thursday night.

I chopped it up really good because it was only like that.

In the morning.

I gave it to him at one o'clock that morning.
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Steve:

So he had an empty stomach when you gave it to him or was it full?

Peggy:

I don't know. I wasn't talkin' to him. He went home early that night
and I had a ?Vl*. .tc.u.r??."/?*.Thursday night, and when I got home he was
asleep. I don't know. I think Sharon irede pizza that night and he had
a piece of pizza, (laughter)

Steve:

Oh, manl

Cindy:

Steve:

Now, vrtiat are you gonna do, you know, when he's dead? How are you
gonna - vAiat's your plan on i t ?

Peggy:

Cover him.

Steve:

How are you gonna

Peggy:

Hey, every day in that bar, if somebody cones in and he's a hypercondriac,
they give him a pill of this. They give him a pill of that. He's been
acting really strange! He's noody. People seen him. He gets pissed at
the customers. I mean

Steve:

I can see why.

Peggy:

H*6«~
L,A rur *,*>«£?»<
Oti,"*!*. ?:T. .L.'f*. :7....., not just lately.

Steve:

Well, does he take anything other than - does he take another drug?

Peggy:

No. Back vfaen he was in Vietnam and everything - and like, I like to

when he's dead?

snoke a little bit of vreed and stuff like that, and he thinks I'm weird.
Steve:

Well, vghat kind of capsules is he taking now, though?

Peggy:

Ampicillin.

Steve:

What has he got? Why is he taking those?

Peggy:

Because he thinks they're all helping his head cold.

Steve:

Oh, okay.

Cindy:
Peggy:

His head cold?
Yea, and he takes decongestants - all the other ones are capsules.
Then he takes six vitamins a day.

Steve:

You're really serious about this?

Peggy:

I've got three kids. My oldest kid three months ago had a full set of
braces. And she got home a half hour \atapnenicjht,
didn't do nothing.
And she's got scars inside her lipsT.. .'.hit-fiur. * He knocks the shit out
of m/ kids all the time. My kids are petrified of him. If I could, I
don't fight. I don't bitch at him or anything. And if I look the wrong
way, I'll hit him. I mean, he won't work. He quit a job at Hill Air Force
Base after 17 years, and anything he wants he goes out and buys. I got to
r«v for it. T'he aot four iobs.

page b

Steve:

Are you gonna get 9one money out of this deal or vtfiat?

Peggy:

No. He doesn't have no life insurance or nothin1 like that.
The only thing he's got coming is his retirement.

Steve:

Will you get that then? er -

Peggy:

I don't know. I don't know where he's sent it to.
nothing about his retirement.

I don't know

Steve
Peggy

He filed for retirement five months ago.

Cindy

he fired or filed..(laughter)

Peggy

He filed a month after he quit the air force base.

Cindy

Oh, I thought he quit tWD years ago.

Peggy

Uh-uh.

Cindy

Oh.

Peggy

He quit, ah -

He quit in the fall.

(sirens in the background)
Cindy:

....thev have a god-damned car, the gas tank broke right over here
atf.'^'.'^it has gas all over the edge, fire department on the shed
up there waiting trying to clean up. Anyway, so

Steve:

Well, did you want your stuff now, that'll do it. And then what the
hell you gonna - ya know - the capsule, if you're not gonna put it in
the capsule, what you gonna -

Peggy:

No, because I think with that capsule, I don't think one capsule a day
will do it.

Steve:

Yea, probably not. So then you're just gonna put it all in his coffee
at one time?

Peggy

Yes.

Steve

Ya gonna do that - now - does he live with you or

Peggy

Yes.

Steve

Oh, okay.

Peggy

Uh-huh.

Steve

When ya gonna do it?

Peggy

I don't know. One night when he comes hone, or

So you're gonna do it at home?

n(

Cindy:

Well, didn't you say he has to have, like - by the end of this month
or something.

Peggy:

Well, right now. Okay. I'll tell ya. I've been trying to file for
divorce for two years. He won't divorce me. He'd contest it. My Dad
left me quite a bit of property, okay. That is my kid's property, but
in a divorce he gets half m/ property because it's ccitinunity property
because we were married when my Dad died. People say, "Oh gads, you
can get a divorce." A contested divorce goes on for years.

Steve:

Does he get half of all of your kid's stuff and your stuff too?

Peggy:

My business.

Cindy:

Which is The Shack and the laundry.

Peggy:

He
a lively hood.

with him not working and everything, he needs to make
He's got - even though
he's got a 90%

chance of getting the vfoole control of the bar.
Cindy:

Is that right?

Peggy:

Yea.

Steve:
Peggy:

Well, this stuff will kill him. Do you want to kill him then?
This sounds horrible, but yes. He's a, he's the most hateful person I've
ever ran into. He hates everybody but himself. The only thing that he
needs is a mirror to look at.

Steve:

It's pretty drastic, but

Peggy:

That's drastic, but people. Ya know, I know that if anybody knew about
this they'd think I was hard on him. But I'm not hard on him
and
everything. If you seen what my kids've gone through the last year, and
everything. I don't care what I go through, I've got to the point where
I, God, I don't care, I'm gonna take my 357 and if he decks me again,
I'm gonna shoot him. That's self defense. But then, I'd have a

Steve:

Okay.

It'll probably take about an hour, maybe an hour and a half to

Cindy:
Steve:

You being a-r{'* .c.V.h.

Peggy:

Thank God i^atjaGt-a-

Steve:

Your ftom gave you the money
I guess?

Peggy:

No. My Mom just thinks he's an ass-hole, and everything. She's said
she'd give me the money for a divorce. But he noved. out two years ago
and then he decided he was gonna move back in. My brother's a cop -

Cindy:

-

You didn't tell her what it was for,

(laughter) I know that one scares me.

Peggy:

My other brother is a Weber County Constable. My cousin's a cop.

Cindy:

.^.^..what you are.

Peggy:

I'm a constable in Willard.

Steve:

Whew! Okay. What do you want to do now?

Peggy:

But you know, I don't ever think it'll come down to them ever thinkin'
I'm doin' it. Everybody knows ire, ya know. I've lived in Willard all
my life. And

Cindy:

....just because, too much coffee? (laughter)

Peggy:

No it couldn't be too much coffee.

Cindy:

I don't even know....

Peggy:

It probably is because of the high speed, but even everybody's oomnented
how he buzzes around all the tine, too. And people teases hint sayin',
"God damnit you're gonna take the wrong kind of pills and you're gonna do
yourself in," ya know, cause one tine somebody brought in a prescription
for percodan, and he's got him in the back room.

Cindy:

Oh, really?

Peggy:

Yea. In somebody else's name. No,I don't know if he's poppin' percodan
because he
one of the things he really likes to do is drink,
drink, drink, drink, and everything. And he's always on a health kick.
He always goes around lookin' in the mirror and stuff like that.

Cindy:

Because he thinks he's

Steve:

Vfell, do you want to give us the money and then ws'll

Peggy:

Thirteen is an unlucky number, isn't it?

Steve:

Where's the thirteen?

Peggy:

Thirteen is how much it has cost me so far, and nothing has worked.

Steve:

I'm sorry.

Peggy:

(laughter)

It's cost you thirteen hundred?

so far I have.

I 'm trying to get everything

Steve:

What was the other money for?

Peggy:

For the black heroine stuff.

Cindy:

I know what you nean.

it was, how much?

Peggy:

Well, somebody ripped us off

almost four.

Steve:

Oh man, I don't remember that. Did I....

Cindy:

No.This

burned us for about, well it was about $300 was what it was.
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Steve:

Then you

some ironey before for the heroine... ?

Cindy:

Seef and that didn't come through and then the other one did
come through.

Steve:

And the heroine didn't work?

Cindy:

Cause, ah

Steve:

God, okay. I believe it'll take me about an hour, maybe an hour and
a half. We can meet you somewhere later or whatever.

Peggy:

Okay, what tine is it?

Cindy:

It's about ten to four.

Peggy:

Okay.

Cindy:

Then he'll be to WDrk at six?

Peggy:

I can be hone unless you want me to run back down here.

Cindy:

....can bring it up.

Peggy:

Then I'll be at home, and everything.

Steve:

Is there any problems - is there going to be somebody there?

Peggy:

Only me.

Steve:

I hate - nobody else is going to be there?

Peggy:

Oh, my seven year old but she's always in watching the TV and everything,
She don't fink.

Steve:

Ah-

Peggy:

There won't be nobody there to

Steve:

Urn, just wsnderin', is there, well, like I say, it's okay,
for you
to leave for a little while and meet us, or something? Would that be
awkward, er?

Peggy:

I could do that.

Steve:

Okay. What we're figurin', vfoy don't you figure we'll be there a little
after six, maybe a little bit later.

Peggy:

Where at?

Steve:

Why don't I just call you, I'm just not comfortable in your house.
sorry, I just, I don't know -

He leaves to go to wDrk at quarter to six again.

It's no problem.

I'm
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Peggy:

And you think I 've got

inraywalls? (laughter)

Steve:

Your brother or your uncle, or

Peggy:

Mf brother is .tV!.... .and he works out of Salt Lake now. He's the
nunber one investigates officer for stolen vehicles.

Cindy:

Oh really. When did he start doing that?

Peggy:

He got transferred. He got the highest award in December for getting
the itost recovered vehicles
and so he got pranoted.

Cindy:

Well, vtfiy don't we just figure on meetin' somevAiere like, God I don't
know, why don't we just holler when we get back and then

Steve:

We'll just call you about six or a little after six.

Peggy:

If it's a little bit after six and everything, maybe 6:30, I'll be at
the bar. Just call me and tell me yw.$'.:.r'^
B+k*«- *f r*«. />*<*«,y*« *•«-. „ ^

Steve:

Then you can get away for a few minutes?

Peggy:

Uh-huh.

Steve:

And we can meet you somewhere and

Peggy:

Ya know, my brother, he wDuld never even suspect me of smoking marijuana.

Steve:

If I happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time....

Peggy:

I only talk to my brother twD tines a month on the telephone.

Cindy:

So Fred never comes over?

Peggy:

No. Fred never cones over. Del, I never see Del at all. No cops ever
come over to my house. More cops hang out at the bar. Off duty cops.

Steve:

Did we

Peggy:

No, all the ones that come in off duty are just sheriff's department and
just want to get away from Brigham City. They go in and party.

Steve:

Would you give this stuff to him tonight then? Do you want to kill
him tonight or how are you gonna plan that out?

Peggy:

I'll probably wait until tOTDrrow night, or MDnday night.

Steve: And then, are you gonna fix him a cup of coffee, or vtfiat? I mean, that's
your deal. All righty, well,
Peggy:

Do you want to take me out next week? (laughter)

Cindy:

He's real cool.

Steve:

Thank you.

Peggy:

You really think I'm weird, don't you?

He's real cool.

v*

„u»
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Cindy:

No. He doesn't.

Steve:

Maybe I'm used to it. I don't know.

Peggy:

I've never, ever, ya know, I've thought and thought for two years. I've
been thinking about it for two years. And it's against my religion and
everything like that, but I don't think - I think that eventually if I
don't do anything, I'm gonna be burying one of my kids.

Steve:

That's scary!

Cindy:

That is scary!

Peggy:

So, if you ever hit somebody that's six, seven or eight the wrong way,
hard ya know, and everything, I mean, ah,

Steve:

Why don't you go to the police?

Peggy:

I'm a bail bondsman and constable. I'd have to go to the Sheriff's
Department, okay? Ms and the Sheriff's Department don't get along
because of my maiden name. My brother raised lots of hell with the
Sheriff's Department. All the time he tells 'em how crooked they
was
all the time. So - and then I don't know if you heard
about the Mike Busby case up in Brigham - the officer that got accused
of raping a girl. Fraftk was takin' her in to the jail.

Cindy:

I don't remember hearing about that.

Peggy:

Well, there was an accident up there and the first officer on duty was
..l?.r.e,:'f..... And five minutes later there was a fatal a mile away. So
he called for back-up to investigate this wreck, and there wsre twD girls
drunk from Logan.

Cindy:

Uh-huh.

Peggy:

And so he went and got them and brought them in and the girl got a DUI
plus
and then he called me to come bail her out. Wfell, to
get out of her DUI she said that she got molested on the way to the
jail. She had another girl with her. But when I went and got her bailed
out of jail and she was wDnderin' how to get back to Logan, and Mike
says, "I can't take you in to Logan, but I can meet another Deputy at
the county line, and he can take you home." kk\ . ??•'.<*• .'Ztii
J./i'x/.\£i*i±..
"You just got nolested by a cop and you'd ride clean up from Brigham
City to the county line?!"

Cindy:

Was there another....

Peggy:

Uh-uh.

Cindy:

And what was the name? Mike Busby?

Peggy:

Uh-huh. This was

Cindy:

And he was with the Sheriff's Department or something?

The next day it was rape charges. He lost his job.

year(s) ago.
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Peggy:

He was in the Sheriff's Department. Well, the twD people that hadn't
testified for 'em was .. JfrirtF.... and me. And you don't go to the
Sheriff's Department if you don't tell the truth. You have to lie!
But we went and told the truth. Because she didn't get raped by Busby.
Ya know, it was set up. They didn't - they - the Sheriff's Department
was mad at him anyway because it was elections and he was in the -beat
for a new guy for Sheriff. And Bob Limb was after his ass for it. v ^°

Cindy:

Oh, really?

Peggy:

It's all politics.

Steve:

Well, what about it? I mean, then there's - like - the Hawaii Five-0 or
something, (laughter)
state deal or something, somebody should be
concerned that
I mean.

Cindy:

It seems like.

Peggy:

It seems like they would and everything like that, but it - he is so
.. ./I'fr^r..... I think if I turned him in, like my oldest daughter
wants to turn him in really, really bad
and she won't do
it because she even knows that if anything happens he'll come right
around. I could walk out of that bar one night and get blown away.

Cindy:

By who?

Peggy:

He knows, like,, oh QDdl^jpich
ones did he know. Just a minute, he knows
Van or Val, ^jpjffi "^^rt ySdrtey^ ,: One time he got pissed off at somebody and
he was gonna talk S ^ 'em. The^guy worked at Hill Air Force Base.

Cindy:

is it -6t» Valley?

Peggy:

Uh-huh. Van or Val. Seems like he ran around with, ah, oh God! The guy
that was connected in with the Prairie Scooner. But he was buying all
the, stealing all the four wheelers and stuff like that and he got caught.
What was his name? And he got put in prison then he got out after twD
years and then he vent back and stole stuff again and got put back in
prison.

Cindy:

Is that right?

Peggy:

Uh-huh. But he was runnin' around with him and there was, there's twD
of them that, in Sun Valley that wsrk out at the Hill Air Force Base.

Cindy:
Peggy:

One*thing Van or Val er -

Cindy:

I know

Peggy:

See, one of em, one of em bought Danny's old Ford pick-up truck - 73
brown and white Ford pick-up truck, four by four.

works at Hill Field.

(tape ends - turned over)
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I^ggy:

Something like that. Van Jensen.

Is there a Jensen there?

Cindy:

I don't know. I've never heard of that name. No, if he's from Ogden
it seems like I vould know him. Y know, cause I know a lot/F. .^i^:^"**
guys from Ogden. I know almost all of 'em, as a matter of fact.

Peggy:

Well, that was - his name was Van, I think.

Cindy:

But I don't really think that they'd put themselves on the line for
Danny. I mean, they'd have to be pretty - or, he'd have to pay them
a hell-of-a-lot of money.

Peggy:

Would m/ insurance policies WDrk.

Cindy:

Huh-ah.

Peggy:

I've got an insurance policy on me for $1,000.

Cindy:

And he don't have one?

Peggy:

Huh-uh. He don't have one.

Steve:

Well, vre better be going.

Cindy:

Okay. Alright, we'll call ya, I guess. At about, probably about
quarter after six, is that okay? Will Danny begone?

Peggy:

Oh, yea. He'll leave between 5:30 and quarter to six

Cindy:

Okay. Alright. And we'll be back so you can get back so you don't get
in trouble. And we'll just call you and meet you somewhere. Okay?

Peggy:

Okay.

Cindy:

So we don't have to come up to the house....

Peggy:

(laughter)

I can't believe you'd say

Cindy:

He's cool.
ya know.

If he wasn't cool I wouldn't have introduced him to ya,

Peggy:

All right.

to the bar.

Hi
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ADDENDUM B

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 881000024

PEGGY B. JOHNSON
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion
for a New Trial. The Court having reviewed the file, the
transcript and the arguments of counsel along with the cases
cited in support thereof, now issues the following Memorandum
Opinion.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Defendant's Motion is based essentially on two main points.
First, there is no Corpus Delecti absent the statements of the
Defendant and Second, there is insufficient evidence to convict
on the counts.
The Court notes that the transcript indicates that the
challenged statements made by the Defendant, which were introduced
at trial, were not objected to. The Court also notes that Rule
77-35-24 U.C.A, Rule 24 Utah Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that the Court may upon motion of a party or upon its' own
initiative grant a new trial. In the interest of justice if
there is any error or inpropriety which had a substantial adverse
affect upon the rights of a party.
In this case the critical question to the Court is whether
or not the statements made by the Defendant in connection with
the incidents alleged to have taken place, evidenceftifi;^f^chwas
introduced at the trial, fall within the purvieft!'-<££) the C o r p u s ^ * ^
Delecti Rule.
C«:p l/ 1Q0Q A
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Case No. 881000024
The Court has reviewed the applicable cases cited by
counsel and is of the opinion that the State vs. Weldon case
cited by Defendant (314 P.2d 353 U.C.A.) does not extend the
Corpus Delecti Rule as it relates to confessions made by the
Defendant to all statements made by the Defendant.
In this case, the now objected to statements were made in
connection with the activity itself, not after arrest and were
not introduced in the form of a confession but to show a motive
and intent at the time other actions were taking place. It is
the judgment of this Court that such statements are admissible
as part of the case in chief and may be used to show Corpus
Delecti.
In view of this decision the Court is then also of the
opinion that the Jury could very well find that the actions
taken by the Defendant, in each of the counts, were taken as a
substantial step toward the stated purpose which was to cause
the death of Mr. Johnson as alleged.
The Court is further of the opinion that the Defendant's
lack of success in achieving her stated purpose is insufficient
to defeat the intent with which the actions were taken. The
analogy is much like firing a weapon at a target but inadvertantly
missing.
Consistant with this opinion, therefore Defendant's Motion
for a New Trial is hereby Denied. Counsel for the State to prepare
the appropriate order.
DATED this
/
day of September, 1989.

Gunnell
District Judge
FTLT
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL

vs.
PEGGY B. JOHNSON,

Case No. 881000024
Defendant.

The above matter having come before the Court on defendants
motion for a new trial and hearing having been held thereon, and
the Court having reviewed the file, the transcript, arguments of
counsel and memoranda in support thereof, and the Court having
issued its Memrandum Decision,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said Motion
be and is hereby denied.

In denying the Motion, the Court adopts

the reasoning set forth in its earlier Memorandum Decision dated
September 7, 1989 and further makes the following specific
findings:
1.

That all of the statements made by the defendant admitted

at trial were made prior to her arrest and were made in conjunction
with her planning the commission of several of the crimes for which
she was convicted.

As noted in the Memorandum Decision, the Court

finds that the statements were made in connection with the illegal
activity itself and were made with regard to her arrangiftjjjryft$£Tobtain

FILED

items with which she intended to murder her husband.
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2.

The Court finds that there was substantial evidence

supporting the jury's verdict that the actions taken by the
defendant, in each of the counts, were taken as a substantial
step toward the stated purpose which was to cause the death of
Mr. Johnson as alleged.

The Court finds that the defendant's

lack of success in achieving her stated purpose is insufficient
to defeat the intent with which the actions were taken.
DATED t h i s

.Z^Lday of ^pfttfllMfts

1989,
- * ^

F. L. GUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL to the defendant's
attorney, Ronald J. Yengich, YENGICH, RICH, XAIZ & METOS, 175 East
400 South, Salt Lake City

UT

84111, postage prepaid, this

If

day o f Q ^ p A j i Ywl^A? 1989.

Secretary / \
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